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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Piracy is a global issue that requires a uniform global response. Costs associated

with piracy continue to grow exponentially in a self-perpetuating cycle where more
frequent attacks lead insurers to raise maritime insurance rates, which companies are
increasingly willing to pay, making future attacks more likely. To put a halt to this
dangerous pattern, the international community must uniformly enforce criminal liability
for corporations that pay ransoms to pirates. The United States material support statutes
provide a workable mechanism for applying liability to corporations in this context and
should therefore be used as a model while the international community updates laws on
the domestic level to hit pirates in the pocketbook via corporate ransoms.
International conventions in this area provide support for domestic developments.
For example, the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea and for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Navigation incorporate a definition of piracy that states
should apply in domestic frameworks. International conventions also provide a useful
link between piracy and terrorism that states can use as the foundation for anti-terrorism
financing laws as they apply to corporate ransoms to pirates.
This international guidance is particularly necessary because under their current
legal regimes, states rarely undertake national prosecution of piracy. This is due to
challenges posed by geographical concerns, lack of evidence, and questions of
jurisdiction. States have attempted to address these obstacles by consolidating all piracy
prosecutions to a single geographical area and by increasing coordination of law
enforcement in piracy hot zones with regional groups. Unfortunately, both of these
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solutions create their own complications and neither approach gets to the root of the
problem: the self-perpetuating financial cycle
Instead, the energy of the international community must be oriented
towards corporate liability. Ransoms paid from corporations to pirates, to secure the
release of cargo ships and hostages, provide the financial incentive to engage in piracy;
establishing corporate liability may be the most effective legal avenue through which to
approach this problem. While such an approach is currently underutilized in the
American legal system, U.S. material support statutes could offer a link between ransom
payments by insurers of maritime corporations and the proliferation of piracy. As other
states develop their own anti-terrorism financing statutes with respect to corporate
ransom payments to pirates, the relevant U.S. statutes can serve as an instructive model.
Paired with updated corporate codes that fill the gaps left between international and
domestic law in this area and the adoption of internationally recognized best practices in
maritime security, states can create a consistent and effective approach to stifling the
financial systems that fuel piracy.

II.

FACTUAL CONTEXT
When corporations pay ransoms to the pirates that hijack their ships and kidnap

their crews, they put their enemies on the payroll. Piracy is now big business for the
failed Somali state, and business is booming.1 As of August 30, 2011, pirates off the
coast of Somalia held 448 hostages and twenty-one ships.2 The pirates are expanding
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Id.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, ¶ 20 delivered to the Security
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2011/549 (Aug. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Report on
Somalia].
2
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their area of operations through the use of mother ships that carry smaller attack vessels.3
Pirate attacks stretch over 2.8 million square miles.4 These attacks are becoming more
expensive in terms of blood and treasure, as the pirates use increasingly violent tactics
and demand ever higher ransoms.5 To date, the lackluster efforts of the international
community to contain the pirate threat have focused on more traditional, paramilitary
aspects of combatting piracy.6
Pirates have become technologically savvy, Nicole Stracke, of the Gulf Research
Centre in Dubai has noted.7 "[P]iracy has developed its own dynamic and now resembles
a professional and highly organized business venture, starting from the selection of
maritime targets to the final stage of receiving and dispensing the ransom."8 Pirates attack
commercial ships from speedboats supported by a larger mother ship.9 They used GPS,
sophisticated weaponry, and satellite phones10 to engage in 142 attacks worldwide in the
first three months of 2011—an all-time high.11 The total cost of piracy in 2010 is
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Press Release, Security Council, In Race Between Pirates and International Community, Pirates Clearly
Winning, Secretary-General’s Top Legal Adviser on Piracy Warns Security Council: Pirates Expanding
Geographic Reach in More Sophisticated, Better Organized Attacks, Says Jack Lang, Seeking Prosecution
of Sea-Borne Raids in Domestic Courts, U.N. Doc. SC/10164 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Race Between
Pirates] available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10164.doc.htm.
4
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of
Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, Annex 1 ¶ 1, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011) [hereinafter Somali Anti-Piracy Courts].
5
Report on Somalia, supra note 1, ¶ 20.
6
Race Between Pirates, supra note 3.
7
Jumana Al Tamimi, Military Action Could Make Pirates More Aggressive, GULF NEWS, (May 7, 2009,
10:51 PM), http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/military-action- could-make-pirates -moreaggressive-1.67936.
8
Id.
9
Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, The Pirates of Somalia: Opportunistic Predators or Environmental Prey?
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 377 (2010).
10
Id. at 453.
11
International Maritime Organization, Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2011,
http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/Statisticalresources/Pages/defa
ult.aspx
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estimated between seven to twelve billion U.S. dollars.12 And the sophistication of pirates
business operations goes even farther. Per Gullestrup, CEO of Danish shipping company
the Clipper Group, recounted finding pirate time sheets onboard a hijacked ship after
pirates withdrew, in an April 2009 radio interview.13 The abandoned time sheets recorded
which pirates had been onboard, the duration of their stay, and how many dollars per day
they earned.14
Instances like this indicate the high level of sophistication of modern piracy
operations and, even more significantly, the strong economic incentives that make
modern piracy such a robust phenomenon. Geopolicity, an international management
consultancy group, reported in its publication “The Economics of Piracy” that the total
income to pirates off the coast of Somalia in 2010 was U.S. $75-238 million.15 This is
projected to increase to U.S. $200-400 million by 2015.16 Individual yearly pirate income
(as extrapolated from fifteen-hundred pirates) is estimated at U.S. $33,000-79,000 from
the low to high end for 2010.17 This is compared to the next-best alternative available in
Somalia, which yields an estimated U.S. $14,500 for a would-be pirate over his entire
working life.18 Income earned by pirates through ransoms is apportioned through a
complicated web. Approximately twenty percent goes to bribe officials and fifty percent
is apportioned for “expenses and payroll.”19 The leader of an attack earns U.S. $10,000-

12

Kaija Hurlburt, et al., The Human Cost of Piracy (Oceans Beyond Piracy, Study) available at
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/cost-of-piracy/human-cost-somali-piracy.
13
All Things Considered: Behind the Business Plan of Pirates Inc., NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 30,
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103657301.
14
Id.
15
The Economics of Piracy (Geopolicity, Study) available at http://www.geopolicity.com/publications.php.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
All Things Considered, supra note 13.
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20,000 and the pirate financer who invested seed capital into the operation receives
approximately thirty percent.20
To further complicate the situation, the regions where piracy flourishes are also
those least equipped to combat it effectively: Somalia, Nigeria, and Southeast Asia.21 To
date, states have been relatively ineffective in combatting piracy through domestic
channels due to many obstacles described below.
Piracy in the modern era presents new challenges as weak state infrastructure and
the veritable treasure chest ransoms provide create a toxic mix. Now, the international
community seeks to disrupt the financial flows that make piracy a profitable industry.22
One mechanism that is currently being explored is the establishment of specialized antipiracy courts. But whether the courts should focus on the perpetrators of acts of piracy at
sea or on the financiers and planners of piracy, or on both, remains an open question.23
The pirates and their financiers are part of a network of pirate militias and local
political organizations.24 The militias began as a response to illegal overfishing by
foreign parties. 25 However, as the pirate industry has expanded the pirates have become
more interested in capturing lucrative cargo vessels than in defending territorial fishing
rights. In Somalia, local politics can involve ties to al-Shabaab,26 a designated terrorist

20

Id.
Michael Gagain, Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy And Developing States: Somalia,
Nigeria, and Indonesia, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169 (2010).
22
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, supra note 4, Annex IV ¶ 3.
23
Id. at Annex IV ¶ 1.
24
Id.
25
See Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, supra note 4, Annex IV ¶ 3.
26
See Matt Bryden, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1811, ¶ 237, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/769 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Report
of the Monitoring Group 1811]; Press Release, Security Council, Despite Strong Counter-Efforts, Piracy
Off Coast Off Somalia Still Major Problem, Security Council is Told: Regional Economies Hurt, U.N. Doc.
SC/10431 (Oct. 31, 2011) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10431.doc.htm.
21
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organization.27 The pirates share ransoms among financiers, sponsors, maritime militias,
ground militias, and associates in the communities.28 Restricting the flow of money to
pirates could stunt the pirate industry.29 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in a report
to the U.N. Security Council that effective prosecution will require broader criminal
legislation, including crimes of extortion, kidnapping, conspiracy, and money
laundering.30 The Security Council has underscored the importance of criminalizing
under domestic laws incitement, facilitation, conspiracy, and attempts to commit piracy
and emphasized the need to investigate those who plan and profit from pirate attacks.31
The Security Council urges states and international organizations to share evidence and
information for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes.32

III.

ANALYSIS
A. International Law
This Part examines the framework of international conventions at the core of

world piracy jurisprudence. It begins with an examination of the Anti-Terrorism
Convention because acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia are at least indirectly linked to
providing support for terrorism and may even be considered terrorism themselves. It next
examines the international conventions on the law of the sea and the safety of maritime
navigation. Together, these conventions provide the definition of acts of piracy. They
27

See Somali Sanctions Regulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 24,394-02 (May 5, 2010) (codified at 31 C.F.R. 551,
Appeal. A); see also U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm, ¶ 4.
28
See Matt Bryden, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1853, Annex III, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2010/91 (Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
Report of the Monitoring Group 1853]; Report of the Monitoring Group, supra note 10, ¶¶ 139-40.
29
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, supra note 4, Annex IV ¶ 3.
30
Id. at ¶ 5.
31
Id. at ¶ 6 (citing S.C. Res. 1976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011)).
32
Id at ¶ 8.
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represent international consensus on what constitutes piracy and have achieved the status
of customary international law. This Part recommends that the international community
adopts a uniform standard of jurisprudence for piracy based on the U.S. model that is
described in Part B(2)(a) infra.
1. Anti-Terrorism Convention
Many ideological and social causes contribute to the piracy explosion of recent
years. One contributing factor is the rise of pirate organizations as “militias” engaged in a
conflict with foreign fishermen poaching off Somalia’s territorial seas.33 Focusing on this
source allows the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism to be used in the piracy context. The Convention prohibits financing any act
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury outside situations of armed conflict, for
the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.34 The wording of that clause supports
inclusion of pirates involved in a quasi-political struggle to capture civilians in order to
fund aggressive operations against intruders from overseas.35 This interpretation of the
Convention reduces the need to connect pirates to designated terrorist organizations. It
also enables the Secretary of State to designate the pirate groups as a terrorist
organization in their own right. It does, however, require a strained reading of the treaty
language. Due to the purported linkage between al-Shabaab and the Somali pirates,36 this

33

See Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, supra note 4, Annex IV ¶ 3.
Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, art. 1-2, Oct. 20, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3949,
T.I.A.S. No. 8413, 1976 WL 166939.
35
Id.
36
See Report of the Monitoring Group 1811, supra note 41; Press Release, Security Council, Despite
Strong Counter-Efforts, Piracy Off Coast Off Somalia Still Major Problem, Security Council is Told:
Regional Economies Hurt, U.N. Doc. SC/10431 (Oct. 31, 2011) available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10431.doc.htm.
34
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paper will assume the ransoms fund terrorism at least indirectly. Other international
treaties offer alternative avenues to combat piracy.
The Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism states that
“kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the life or personal integrity of those
persons to whom the state has the duty to give special protection according to
international law, as well as extortion in connection with those crimes. shall be
considered common crimes of international significance, regardless of motive.”37
Therefore, if any persons “entitled to special protection”38 are onboard a ship the pirates
capture then the Convention on Terrorism again comes into play.
The Convention prohibits kidnapping, murder, and extortion in connection with
terrorism.39 A person commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if he
directly or indirectly, unlawfully, and willfully provides or collects funds with the
intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used in full or in
part in order to carry out an act which constitutes terrorism.40 Regardless of whether the
pirate militia is a terrorist organization or simply connected to al-Shabaab, when a
corporation pays a ransom it is at least indirectly providing funds with the knowledge that
money could be used to carry out acts which constitute terrorism. Thus, the Convention
of the Organization of American States approaches the problem from the corporate side
rather than the pirate side.
International treaties can also be used to modify the behavior of insurance
companies. When the insurance companies contract with corporations to pay pirate
37

Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, art. 1, Oct. 20, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3949,
T.I.A.S. No. 8413, 1976 WL 166939.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. (emphasis added).
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ransoms, they too subject themselves to possible liability. The insurance company
provides funds to the corporation to provide to the pirates, who either are terrorists
themselves or are providing some portion of those funds to terrorists.41 The insurance
companies are therefore also liable under the Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism.
Liability could attach to the corporations and insurance companies even if the
insurance company never pays a ransom. The Convention prohibits “providing or
collecting” funds with the knowledge that they will be used to fund terrorism. Through
the payment and collection of the insurance premiums, the corporation and insurers have
already fulfilled the actus reus element of the prohibition even absent any involvement
by terrorists. They also already possess the knowledge that the funds will be used, at least
indirectly, to fund terrorism. If the corporations and the insurance companies have
already engaged in prohibited conduct, then they should disclose this potential liability on
their balance sheets. Similarly, that the subject matter of the contract may be the
provision of illegal funds, opens the possibility that the contract is void.42 The Security
Council currently keeps under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions to
individuals and entities who illicitly finance pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia.43

41

See Matt Bryden, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1811, ¶ 237, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/769 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Report
of the Monitoring Group 1811]; Press Release, Security Council, Despite Strong Counter-Efforts, Piracy
Off Coast Off Somalia Still Major Problem, Security Council is Told: Regional Economies Hurt, U.N. Doc.
SC/10431 (Oct. 31, 2011) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10431.doc.htm.
42
Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 85 U.S. 375, 385 (1873) (“[A] contract to do an act forbidden by law is
void, and cannot be enforced in a court of justice.”).
43
See Report of the Monitoring Group 1811, supra note 41, ¶ 123; Report on Somalia, supra note 1,
Annex IV ¶ 11.
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2. Legal Framework From Conventions Safeguarding Sea Travel
Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea44 (“UNCLOS”) piracy consists
of any illegal violent acts committed for private ends by the crew of a private ship,
directed at another ship on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state.45
Participating in the operation of a pirate ship and acts inciting or intentionally facilitating
piracy also fall within this definition.
Because the UNCLOS bans “any act inciting”

46

piracy, it could cover

corporations that secure ransom insurance in order to traverse pirate-infested waters. It
may be faster and less expensive for the corporations to send their ships through pirate
hot zones. But if they choose to use such risky routes with the intent to pay the ransom on
any captured ships, they may fall within the ban in the Convention for inciting piracy.
Clearly, despite being the victims of the pirate activities, businesses knowingly facilitate
pirate activity by paying ransoms. Because the Convention requires an intent to
facilitate,47 the shipping companies must have intended to pay the pirates in order to
violate the Convention. Arguably, under this view of the Convention, entities would still
be able to pay ransoms if they were attacked in a one-off pirate attack, but they could not
knowingly enter pirate-infested waters, planning to pay the ransom on some percentage
of their shipping as a cost of doing business. Instead, the companies should opt to pay
more for fuel costs and skirt the range of the pirate ships.

44

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), reprinted at 1992 WL 725374 (which the United States has signed but not ratified).
45
Id. at art. 101. (“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the
high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii)
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State”).
46
Id.
47
Id.
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Under the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
Maritime Navigation (SUA) article 3(1)(f),48 it is an offense for any person unlawfully
and intentionally to communicate information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship.49 This provision could operate to criminalize
deceitful practices from corporations. On its face, the intentionality prong only applies to
the first action, “communicates information which he knows to be false.”50 The second
half of the prohibition, “thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship;”51 appears to
be strict liability. Therefore, if a corporation knowingly makes a false statement, such as
a false assessment of the relative probability of interaction with pirates during a voyage,
and that statement endangers the safe navigation of the ship, they could be liable under
the Convention even though the corporation did not intend to endanger the navigation of
the ship.
According to article 3(2)(b) of the SUA Convention, it is unlawful to abet the
commission of the offenses set forth in the preceding paragraph, which are related to
piracy.52 Under the rationale set forth above, with regard to the UNCLOS, corporations or
other entities that budget out the cost of paying ransoms may be abetting the seizure of
48

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO. Doc.
Sua/Conf/15.Rev.1 (1988), reprinted at 27 I.L.M. 668 (which the United States has signed and ratified)
[hereinafter SUA Convention].
49
Id. at art. 3(1)(f).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at art. 3 (“1 Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) seizes or
exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or (b) performs an
act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or (c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or (d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or
is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or (e) destroys or seriously damages maritime
navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of a ship; or (f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering
the safe navigation of a ship; or (g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the
attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).”).
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that ship. The Maritime Navigation Convention applies even before the ship begins its
journey as long as the ship is scheduled to navigate beyond the territorial seas of a single
state.53 Corporations could perhaps weaken the inference that they are abetting seizure of
their ships by implementing the International Port Facility and Security code system
instituted as a provision in the Convention.
3. Hostage Taking
Piracy for ransom involves taking hostages. The U.N. Security Council strongly
condemns the growing practice of hostage-taking by pirates operating off the coast of
Somalia and calls upon states to cooperate on the issue.54 The International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages prohibits unlawful capture of individuals to compel
another entity to do or abstain from doing anything.55 This provision applies to pirates
who capture sailors for financial gain by compelling a corporation to pay a ransom in
exchange for their release. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
encompasses acts taken by corporations as “juridical persons.”56 A key part of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages is that states must refrain from
taking any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.57 It is
therefore unlawful under the Convention for any state, and by extension, any agent of a
state, to pay the ransom or to fulfill pirates’ demands as a condition for the release of
their sailors. While this is less applicable to U.S. shipping companies, for corporations in
which a state owns a substantial share of the stock, or any nationalized corporation,

53

Id. at art. 4(1).
S.C. Res. 1976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011).
55
Terrorism Taking of Hostages Convention Between the United States of America and Other
Governments, art. 1, June 3, 1983, TIAS 11081 reprinted in 1983 WL 144724.
56
Id. art 1.
57
Id.
54
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payment by the corporation could be akin to payment by the state, thereby bringing it
under the scope of the Convention. Each state party to the Convention also agreed to
make hostage taking a domestic offense in their own state punishable by appropriate
penalties.58 Therefore, there should be an abundance of jurisdictions that have criminal
statutes sufficient to put the pirates on notice and to prosecute the pirates when they are
captured.
The Convention frames the requirement to act on this issue in the strongest
possible terms: states must prosecute or extradite.59 An aut dedere aut judicare
requirement, coupled with widespread domestic practice criminalizing hostage taking and
universal jurisdiction over pirates as hostis humani generis, theoretically makes
prosecution of every captured hostage-taking pirate inevitable. However, as is often the
case, theory diverges from state practice. Many pirates are caught and released without
ever facing prosecution, as described in Part B infra.60 Outside of Kenya, states generally
appear reluctant to prosecute acts of piracy. However, Kenya lacks the resources and
human capital to shoulder the entire judicial burden of the piracy courts. If many states
are unwilling to prosecute every pirate they catch, and Kenya is unable to prosecute many
of the cases arising from Somalia, then there may be need of a hybrid tribunal for piracy
located in Kenya with the mandate and the resources to do the job.

58

Id.
Id.
60
See S.C. Res. 1976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011) (“Further expressing concern over a large
number of persons suspected of piracy having to be released without facing justice, reaffirming that the
failure to prosecute persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts of the international community and being determined to create
conditions to ensure that pirates are held accountable”).
59
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B. National Responses
The power to defeat piracy ultimately lies with states. In an era of global financial
hardship, with accompanying reductions in world naval forces, states must put additional
emphasis on legal rather than kinetic mechanisms for combating piracy. State prosecution
of piracy is therefore not only advisable, but necessary.
1. Challenges to Domestic Prosecution
Three obstacles, geography, evidence, and jurisdiction, stand in the way of
successful state prosecution of pirates in national courts. This Part illustrates what states
face when they attempt to try pirates in domestic proceedings and tracks two examples of
the limited state effort to prosecute pirates. The Part recommends the international
community adopt uniform procedures to limit financing to piracy via anti-terrorism
financing states based on the American approach. Though the full potential of the
material support statute has not yet been fully realized in the U.S., it provides a useful
link between ransoms to pirates and facilitation of terrorism, which could apply smoothly
in the domestic contexts of many states.
a. The First Obstacle: Geography
This problem results from a very narrow definition of piracy in pertinent
international treaties, state sovereignty issues, and the collective action problem. Most
definitions of piracy limit it to the “high seas” making it an exclusively “extraterritorial
crime.”61 Because most piracy activity occur in territorial waters (from 1989-1993,
almost sixty-two percent of the attacks made by pirates occurred in territorial waters),62
foreign law enforcement is precluded from pursuing pirates where most criminal activity

61
62

Bento, supra note 75, at 415 (citing UNCLOS).
Id. at 419.
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takes place. When pirates expand their activities to the high seas, they often limit the
foray to times when law enforcement is out of sight. When faced with a naval force,
pirates generally race back into the safe zone of territorial waters. Because the UNCLOS
does not allow reverse hot pursuit (where a ship pursuing pirates follows the pirates from
the high seas into the territorial waters of another state), law enforcement cannot follow.63
Where territorial waters are poorly monitored by the state (as in Somalia) pirate activity
flourishes. The limitations posed by international treaties are just one part of the
geographical conundrum states face, however. They must also contend with issues of
sovereignty.
In Southeast Asia, where many states encroach on a high-piracy region, the issue
of sovereignty creates another obstacle. Piracy is a particular problem in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, a high-traffic route between the Indian Ocean and the South
China Sea.64 The narrowest point in this shipping lane is 1.2 nautical miles65 thus the high
seas to territorial seas problem described above is less of an issue. Unfortunately, this
challenge is replaced by struggles in the region to face piracy within the constraints of
state boundaries. Indonesian and Malaysian law enforcement have historically been
limited to their respective territories due to “strong regional concerns over infringement
on littoral states’ sovereignty.”66 This hampers the movement of law enforcement and the
exchange of information necessary to form a coordinated response towards pirates who
do not respect such geographic boundaries. A lack of mutual trust has created a haven for

63

Id. at 420.
J. Ashley Roach, Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
59 J. INT’L AFFAIRS, 97 (Fall 2005).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 98.
64

16

piracy activity in the Straits of Malacca.67 This is exaggerated by the collective action
problem experienced not only in Southeast Asia, but throughout the world.
The collective action problem results from a high number of actors who each face
a small risk of falling victim to piracy and the high cost of counter-piracy measures.
Piracy is a transnational problem that generally involves many states—pirates may be of
many nationalities and are very mobile. The flag that the ship overtaken by pirates flies
may be different than the nationality of the crew, which may be different than the
headquarters of the corporation transporting goods. And though instances of pirate
attacks are very frequent in the “hot zones” (e.g., Somalia, Nigeria, Straits of Malacca),
these areas are so frequently trafficked that any given ship has a fairly small chance of
being attacked.68 Capping the collective action problem is the fact that counter-piracy
efforts are very expensive.69 Thus, piracy becomes a tragedy of the commons where
states have the incentive to stick to the status quo, hoping their citizens and business
interests are not targeted by pirates and that someone else foots the bill to counteract this
threat.70
b. The Second Problem: Evidence
The evidentiary problem states face with respect to prosecuting pirates is
exaggerated by the geographic problems described above. If states cannot pursue pirates
and apprehend them, it becomes nearly impossible to prosecute them. Moreover,
international statutes fail to address inchoate crimes related to piracy. UNCLOS makes

67

Id. at 103.
See Pt. C(1) infra.
69
See generally Economics of Piracy supra note 15.
70
See Bento, supra note 75, at 409.
68
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no mention of attempted piracy, solicitation of piracy, or aiding and abetting of piracy.71
This requires law enforcement actually catch pirates “in the act” and makes it less likely
pirates will be caught at all.72
This systematic evidentiary deficiency has lead to the common practice of “catchand-release” where law enforcement is forced to let pirates go for lack of conclusive
evidence that the detainees are in fact pirates.73 If suspected pirates are taken into
custody, a lack of evidence may make it impossible to detain them for the time necessary
to build a case against them, creating a circular problem where states would rather let
pirates go than risk spending time and money in a futile effort.74 Uncertainty over the
legality of detainment also contributes to jurisdictional problems, as illustrated below.
c. The Third Problem: Jurisdiction
Despite the prevalence of piracy as an international problem throughout history,
there has never been a comprehensive international legal system for dealing with that
problem.

75

State responses to piracy have always been inconsistent.76 Until the mid-

1800s, the state practice of conscripting pirates as seafaring mercenaries in wartime
further complicated international response.77 Pirates could become “state-sponsored
privateers” with a license granted by a special maritime court that regulated ships during
wartime.78 This effectively changed how states responded to individuals conducting
piratical acts during non-wartime—pirates were effectively a commodity. In 1865, the
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Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law abolished the delineation between
privateering and piracy.79 This was a turning point in the international response to
piracy—from this point on, states began to treat piracy as a “serious and definite
crime.”80
Piracy is the oldest crime to which customary international law gives states
universal jurisdiction because pirates are deemed to be hostis humani generis, or the
enemies of all mankind.81 But universal jurisdiction is rarely used by states to prosecute
pirates.82 In addition to the narrow jurisdictional scope provided by relevant international
treaties,83 confusion over the treaties’ applicability to domestic law and a lack of
jurisprudence make states hesitant to use treaties as a basis of jurisdiction at all.84 Instead,
states have used other sources of jurisdiction in the rare cases they choose to prosecute
individuals suspected of piracy.
Pirates held in custody in domestic courts have frequently been released by states
that eventually decided they lacked a jurisdictional basis to try the pirates.85 European
states often release suspected pirates rather than transferring them to domestic courts
because the states fear the pirates will plea amnesty. Members of the European
Convention on Human Rights are unable to extradite the accused to their home countries
if the detainees would risk death or torture upon return.86 It appears these fears are not
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baseless. Recently, two accused pirates in the Netherlands have expressed the intention to
claim asylum.87
Taken together, geographical constraints, evidentiary obstacles, and jurisdictional
confusion make states at best reticent to effectively prosecute pirates and at worst
functionally unable. Yet even in the face of these significant odds, states have found
creative ways to address piracy, as seen below.
2. State Response to Piracy
Piracy can refer to two offences.88 The first, discussed above, is piracy jure
gentium, or piracy under the law of nations.89 The second is violation of a state’s
municipal laws and is called municipal piracy.90 Municipal piracy is more flexible and
allows states to define the act however they please.91 However, states can only prosecute
acts of municipal piracy with a jurisdictional nexus to the state that promulgated the
municipal law.92 By contrast, general piracy has a less flexible definition, as it is the
agreed upon definition in the international community, but greater jurisdictional
flexibility. Any state can prosecute individuals for committing acts of general piracy.93
a. United States Domestic Law
In the Define and Punish Clause, the U.S. Constitution explicitly authorizes the
U.S. Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations.”94 The U.S. Congress explicitly intended to
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adopt a flexible definition that is always current with developing international norms.95
Tying the definition to international law did not make it unconstitutionally vague.96
Congress derives the authority to make treaties respecting piracy from the Define and
Punish Clause working in tandem with the Necessary and Proper Clause.97 The definition
of piracy continually evolves with international consensus.98 The United States
recognizes a right to prosecute piracy even when it is committed outside of U.S.
territorial waters by a foreign person on another foreign person.99
Cases brought to trial must evaluate the acts under the definition of piracy as it
existed in the international community at the time the alleged piracy occurred in order to
avoid nullem crimen sine lege concerns.100 This is reaffirmed in United States v. Said,
where the Court found the Somali defendant’s actions were not piracy because
unauthorized violence (in this instance firing at a United States naval vessel) did not
constitute “forcible depredations” under customary international law.101 Therefore, it is
worth the effort to develop clear legal standards by which to adjudicate cases of corporate
payment of pirate ransoms as early as possible, in order to put the corporations on notice
and deter the payment. The United States defines piracy by reference to the law of
nations, which is a developing standard.102 The domestic criminal law states, “whoever,
on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
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afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”103 The
developing international law definition incorporates elements of the law of the
UNCLOS.104
The United States satisfied its “extradite or prosecute” obligations from the SUA
Convention by codifying the text of Article 3 of in “Violence Against Maritime
Navigation.”105 Because the Article 3 offenses involve forceful interference with property
on the open sea they fall within Congress’s piracy powers.106
b. Foreign Domestic Response
Apart from the United States and Kenya, few states have prosecuted pirates in
their national courts. There are current examples of pirates being tried in Germany, the
Netherlands, and France, but these instances are few compared to the hundreds of
instances of piracy reported each year.107
One such trial involves ten Somalis accused of piracy in Germany after a Dutch
frigate patrolling the waters east of the Horn of Africa apprehended them.108 The Somali
defendants had attacked the MV Taipan, a container ship owned by a German
company.109 The pirates likely would have been released by the Dutch soldiers had they
thrown their weapons overboard.110 But in the commotion they were caught with pistols,
assault rifles, grenade launchers and a cricket bat and were eventually transferred to
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Germany for prosecution.111 They have been charged with attacking maritime traffic and
abduction with the intent to extort money, for which the maximum penalty is fifteen
years.112 Complicated human rights issues have already surfaced. As one of the
defendants told German newspaper Spiegel, “I love my country . . . but I don't want to
die. I wouldn't go back to Somalia for a million dollars."113
A recent Dutch case further highlights the challenges of piracy prosecution. In
October 2010, a group of pirates were caught hijacking a private yacht by a Dutch naval
vessel patrolling off the coast of Tanzania.114 During the altercation, two South African
crewmembers were taken hostage by pirates who evaded the Dutch seamen and have
been held since October 2010.115 A ransom of ten million dollars has been demanded but
some fear the hostages were killed in Somalia.116 A group of twenty pirates were
successfully apprehended by the Dutch force but fifteen were released for lack of
evidence. The Netherlands tried to extradite the remaining five pirates to South Africa but
South Africa declined to take them.117 In August 2011, the five defendants were given
sentences ranging from four-and-a-half to seven years for their roles in the attack in
Dutch court.118
These examples illustrate that while domestic prosecution of pirates does occur, it
is rare because the process is often encumbered by challenges. Naval forces rarely catch
pirates red handed, jurisdictional and evidentiary issues arise during trial, and questions
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of extradition can surface even after a defendant convicted of piracy has served jail
time.119 In response to these obstacles, states have found creative solutions to the problem
of how to prosecute pirates.
c. Alternative Solutions
The two main approaches states have explored are (1) the Kenya Bilateral
Agreement Solution and (2) the regional group solution. Each of these solutions seeks to
overcome the geographical, evidentiary, and jurisdictional problems described above.
Yet, while each makes some headway towards the effective prosecution of piracy, they
each raise new problems, indicating the international community has not yet found the
best way to approach the problem of piracy.
Kenya tried its first modern piracy case after the USS Winston S. Churchill
captured ten heavily armed pirates off the coast of Somalia in January 2006.120 The
pirates were transferred to Mombasa, Kenya for prosecution based on the principle of
universal jurisdiction.121 All ten individuals were convicted in Kenyan court and
sentenced to seven years in prison.122 The decision to turn the pirates over to Kenya, and
Kenya’s successful prosecution, were hailed as a victory for justice and a valuable
indication of regional commitment to the prosecution of pirates.123 A meeting of United
Nations experts in Nairobi in November 2008 created the “Nairobi Report” which
recommended an enhancement of regional legal systems, particularly Kenya, to
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prosecute, convict, and incarcerate pirates regardless of which state apprehends them and
transfers them to shore.124
Subsequently, the United Kingdom entered into a bilateral agreement with Kenya
in December 2008 through which pirates caught by British vessels would be transferred
to Kenya for prosecution.125 A bilateral agreement between the United States and Kenya
soon followed in January 2009.126 Later that year, the European Union concluded a deal
to facilitate the transfer of pirates captured by EU NAVFOR (the European Union-led
naval force) to Mombasa for prosecution.127 Agreements with Denmark, Canada, and
China have since followed.128 Pursuant to the Nairobi Report, the U.N. Office on Drugs
and Crime provides assistance to Kenya and the Seychelles to facilitate the establishment
of effective courts to try pirates.129 Kenya’s partners in the bilateral agreements also give
financial assistance in exchange for utilizing Kenyan courts to transfer pirates. It is
proving to be a very expensive proposition: support is estimated within the range of $2.4
million and Kenya has requested additional funds.130 As of October 2009, Kenya had
custody of around 123 piracy suspects of which ten had been tried and sentenced.131
These numbers indicate the mixed results that the Kenya solution yields. On one
side, it is valuable because it gives the region most affected by piracy the lead role in
prosecution of pirates and allows a body of relevant expertise to develop in a
concentrated place. However, Kenyan courts pose feasibility concerns. Kenya has around
53,000 prisoners currently in domestic jails that have a maximum capacity of around
124
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16,000.
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Kenyan courts also face a backlog of more than 870,000 cases.133 These

concerns make it clear that transfer to Kenyan courts is not the final solution to dealing
with apprehended pirates.
As for the second alternative approach, regional groups have made significant
strides in spite of geographic, evidentiary, and jurisdictional concerns but also pose
challenges tied to the expense of naval forces. Japan pioneered the regional group
approach in 2004, with the Regional Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed
Robbery (“ReCAAP”), the first treaty created exclusively to combat piracy.134 ReCAAP
boasts sixteen member nations that have established and maintain a piracy Information
Sharing Center in Singapore.135 This center allows members to work together despite the
sovereignty interests that have inhibited Indonesia and Malaysia in particular from
effectively pursuing pirates in the Straits of Malacca.136
East African nations used ReCAAP as a model when they agreed to begin work
on a similar network at the Djibouti meeting in January 2009.137 An East African regional
anti-piracy group would join the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
(“MOWCA”) which was created in 1975 but has increased its efficacy in recent years to
help member states manage port and vessel security. MOWCA has also established an
“integrated coastguard network” amongst its twenty-five members.138
Yet the regional approach also has weaknesses. Using law enforcement as the
main mechanism to combat piracy is very expensive. In this era of austerity when law
132
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enforcement budgets are continually whittled down, constabulary efforts to respond to
piracy are likely among the first to go.139 This makes a legal solution all the more
valuable. As alluded to previously, a particularly effective legal solution would be one
that affixed liability to corporations and their insurers for the payment of ransoms.
C. Corporations
Because ransoms paid from corporations to pirates in order to free cargo ships and
hostages provide the financial incentive to engage in piracy, corporate liability may be
the most effective legal avenue to address the financial sources that fuel piracy. But this
approach is underutilized in the current American legal structure though the statutory
framework exists. While a few current domestic statutes deal with corporate liability,
none speak to the relationship between corporations and piracy directly. Most relevant
statutes address liability from bribery but not ransoms. Furthermore, these statutes focus
on bribery and illegal payments to governments rather than independent third parties like
pirates.140 Corporations may, however, incur liability for ransom payments under
domestic anti-terrorism financing statutes.
This Part first explores maritime insurance and the role insurance companies play
in payment of ransoms. Second, it addresses corporate codes of conduct and their
potential to fill the gap between current corporate practice in the maritime industry and
states’ efforts to eliminate piracy. Third, this Part addresses shipping industry best
practices and how their universal adoption would lead to a more cohesive global
139
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approach. Finally, it examines corporate liability under United States domestic terrorism
statutes. This Part argues that the U.S. approach to material support, as seen in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339, offers link between ransom payments by insurers of maritime corporations and
the proliferation of piracy. It should, therefore, be implemented throughout the domestic
legal systems of the international community to create a consistent and effective approach
to stifling the financial systems that enable piracy.
1. Insurance Companies
Maritime insurance companies, like Lloyd’s of London, are generally the parties
actually making ransom payments to pirates, as corporations have found extensive
insurance coverage increasingly important in pirate-infested waters.141 The greater part of
these insurance purchases is for Kidnap and Ransom insurance premiums (“K & R”) that
reimburse companies when ransoms are demanded and often provide for a negotiation
expert to guide customers through the process.142 Insurance premiums “can range from
thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars based on the country risk, the
nature of the business and the employee's profile."143 As of 2005, eighty percent of
Fortune 500 corporations had Kidnap and Ransom insurance and that number has steadily
increased.144 In addition, as indicated by the “high risk” label given to the Gulf of Aden
by Lloyd’s (the world’s leader in K & R insurance) the premiums in the Gulf of Aden are
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very costly.145 Corporations shipping in the Gulf of Aden often see insurance as a form of
necessary risk-management since many feel they cannot afford to change shipping
routes.146
Through high insurance rates and a willingness to pay ransoms, the maritime
insurance industry is creating a profitable market for pirates and thereby encouraging
continued attacks.147 Piracy has cost global shipping an estimated thirteen and fifteen
billion dollars and the total steadily increasing.148 While most insurance agencies require
that the corporations take “every reasonable effort” not to disclose the existence of their
K & R policy and take reasonable steps to prevent the kidnapping from occurring in the
first place, these requirements are too board and ill-defined to be effective.149
Furthermore, a policy of ransom payments is a defensive measure taken by corporations
who choose to do business in dangerous waters when the gravity of the problem clearly
requires preventative measures.150 It appears there is a perverse incentive for insurance
agencies to support the threat of piracy as they profit from the sale of additional insurance
coverage for companies traveling these treacherous waters.151
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The solution to the problem created by a market that profits from the payment of
ransoms to Somali pirates is to create strong legislation amongst all states to assign
criminal liability to the payments. The insurance industry needs to be restructured in a
way that excludes ransoms from its premiums. Many insurance companies have made
similar changes in coverage with respect to acts of terrorism and no longer indemnify
ransom payments companies who knowingly travel through waters as dangerous as the
Gulf of Aden.152 While corporations and insurance companies may be reticent to change
the status quo which is livable for shipping companies and lucrative for insurers, pirate
ransoms are predicted to continue their astronomical increase in the future. The
exponential cost of piracy to the maritime industry and global consumers will soon reach
an untenable level. The only way to halt this cycle is for companies to stop paying pirate
ransoms. The first step to this end is to prevent insurance companies from offering such
indemnification.153
2. Codes of Conduct and Best Practices
The conflict between state interests and private conduct regarding piracy and
ransoms further incapacitates effective responses to this problem. In the public sphere,
states’ goal is to end the scourge of piracy. This can be achieved by halting ransom
payments which also removes a source of funding to terrorist operations. Conversely, in
the private sector, paying ransoms is just seen as a cost of doing business. An
examination of a wide breadth of corporate codes (ranging from international shipping
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corporations to international oil companies to multinational corporations) reveals there is
little, if any, mention of payments made to third parties that are not directly tied to
contracts.154 A minority of the codes in this sample refer to bribes made during the course
of conducting business, but these are generally to secure business or entreat officials of
foreign governments.155 No codes reviewed for this paper mention ransoms in any form.
This leads to the conclusion that an important gap in codes of conduct exists when
corporations are faced with ransom or kidnapping of goods or personnel. This gap
threatens both state interests and corporations’ long-term financial viability. For codes of
conduct to be effective regulators of corporate behavior, the codes must be
comprehensive enough to address the contingencies that arise in the course of doing
business, including a transparent corporate policy on ransoms. The time has come for
corporations to reexamine the “business as usual” policy of using insurance premiums to
cover the cost of recovering hijacked company property or personnel. The price is too
high and other solutions more effectively treat the causes of piracy rather than solely the
symptoms.
Shipping industry–best practices could also more effectively address state security
interests and streamline corporate costs in the maritime industry. Shipping Industries Best
Practices includes “training of crew, implementation of the Ship Security Reporting
System, use of military escort and crisis management services.”156 While there has been
improvement in technological developments of security on seafaring ships, profit margins
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are a significant concern for the industry.157 To many shipping companies, the cost of
new technology appears too high and the accompanying risks to great (such as an
increased possibility of injuries from arming sailors) to justify fully implementing best
practices.158 Because the probability of an individual ship being hijacked is relatively
small given the high traffic through areas of concern, shipping companies are hesitant to
adopt preventative security measures.159 The best way to change corporate perception of
the profitability of increased security is through better information and support for
corporations willing to make the switch. International agencies such as the International
Maritime Organization or regional agencies such as Maritime Security Center Horn of
Africa (“MSCHOA”) are in a good position to make this information available and
counsel corporations on how best to implement strategies to increase safety and reduce
long-term costs.160
One example of such effort is the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (“ISPS”), which seeks to create a cohesive system of agency governance over the
detection and prevention of security incidents in the maritime industry.161 ISPS seeks to
provide all ships that have signed onto the provisions with a ship security alert system. It
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also trains ship crews to analyze and prepare for threats that arise during international
transit.162
Another solution is to employ outside security services to increase ship security in
order to deter pirates ex ante. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers (“ICoC”) aims to provide support services and set standards of security
forces.163 As of October 2011, 211 companies had signed on to the Code.164 The shipping
industry’s goal must be to develop a uniform, industry-wide standard for security and to
establish a governance structure capable of ensuring adherence to the policies of regional
and international organizations.
3. Financial Statutes
Unfortunately, U.S. financial statutes are of little use to states trying to prevent
corporations from paying ransoms. One of the most important federal protections
afforded corporations in the ransom context comes from the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (“FCPA”) which saves corporations from liability payments made to third parties
under duress.165 Courts have interpreted this provision of the FCPA to include extortion
payments.166 While the Act does carve out instances where corporations can incur
liability, ransom payments do not easily fit within the scope of these exceptions. First,
corporations are liable when they pay a government official. Second, corporations are

162

International Maritime Organization, Frequently Asked Questions: ISPS,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/FAQ/Pages/FAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
163
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 9 Nov. 2010, http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2011).
164
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatories, 1 Oct. 2011,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_October_2011_-_New_Companies.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2011).
165
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006).
166
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1.

33

liable when they make such a payment with the intent of obtaining or retaining business
with any person.167
United States v. Gonzalez held that liability protection offered under the Act
extends to payments made to pirates for the release of goods or persons because such
payments are under duress and not bribes.168 This holding extends to payments
corporations make to pirates for ransom, as the corporations do not willfully choose to
engage in market transactions with pirates. Rather, Gonzalez found corporations are
forced to pay a ransom in return for their agents and property from which they cannot
feasibly walk away.169
4. Anti-Terrorism Financing Statutes
Unlike financial statutes, anti-terrorism financing statutes could be the answer to
ending ransom payments to pirates through corporate liability. Under the USA Patriot
Act, corporations can be held liable for supplying material support to certain foreign
terrorist organizations.170 Under Title VIII of the Act defining Strengthening the Criminal
Law Against Terrorism, § 805 defines material support for terrorism as “any property,
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services . . .” as found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.171 This definition of
material support could then be applied to the pirate ransom context because such
payments are used to perpetuate further hijackings. Furthermore, carrying the definition
of material support over from § 2339A, liability for corporations could be established
through aiding and abetting terrorist organizations in carrying out terrorist activities.
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Support for this avenue for corporate liability is found in estimates that pirates have paid
one-million dollars or more to al-Shabaab and their foreign instructors.172
The history of this statute is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B from the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which criminalizes provisions of
material support to designated terrorist organizations.173 The aid must be intentional and
the corporation must know that the organization is a terrorist organization or one that
engages in acts of terrorism.174 The corporation does not need to intend to further the
organization’s terrorist activities; it is sufficient that the corporation had knowledge
concerning the organization’s connection to terrorist activities.175 Congress’ reasoning
here is expressed expansively as “all contributions to foreign terrorist organization”
further the terrorist group’s activities.176 This expansive approach is furthered by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which redefines “material
support” of a terrorist organization to include providing “any property, tangible or
intangible, or service,” which in the context of § 2339B includes “currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities.”177
To create the link between pirates and terrorism, the U.S. Secretary of State can
designate an organization as a foreign terrorist group under § 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.178 Under the scope of “terrorist activities” of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which is transferred to § 2339B, hijacking or sabotage of any
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conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle) is unlawful.179 Jurisdiction over
these actions that occur outside the United States is established in the statute under §
2339B(d)(1), which is an extraterritorial statute providing for jurisdiction over actions
that are considered Federal Crimes of Terrorism.180 In addition, as stated by the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Peterson, “a jurisdictional nexus exists
when the aim that activity is to cause harm to . . . U.S. citizens or interests.”181
These are just a few U.S. statutes that could be used to create liability for
corporations that pay ransoms to pirates. Corporations could also be held liable for aiding
and abetting terrorist organizations when they provide payments to governments that
support terrorist activities. In 18 U.S.C. § 2332D (b)(2)(B) a juridical person of the
United States, here a corporation, can be held liable for transactions made with a foreign
government that they “know or have reasonable cause to know” as a country that
supports international terrorism.182 For the purpose of this paper, liability would be
contingent upon whether plaintiffs could link corporate payments to Somali pirates to
several major political figures in Somalia. This link could be established through research
that indicates ransoms paid to Somali pirates, particularly the class of pirates who are
fishermen frustrated with an over-fishing of their waters, are often used to prompt
political change in the country.183
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A final avenue to prosecute corporations for piracy ransom payments is under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), which states persons can be
prosecuted by the United States for willfully engaging in “financial transactions” with
persons determined to be “a threat to United States national security” by the President.184
To defend against this charge, a corporation could raise a similar argument to that which
it would raise against an FCPA charge: the corporation that pays a ransom to pirates is
not willfully engaging with the pirates, because it is under duress when it pays. But the
Act might still be useful if a court overcame the duress argument, reasoning that given
the high volume of pirate attacks in specific regions, corporations were willfully
undertaking a likely risk of engagement with pirates.
Given the overall framework of United States domestic statutes, the liability of
corporations that pay ransoms to pirates needs to be reviewed in the context of antiterrorism financing statutes. By paying the ransoms the Somali pirates demand,
corporations fund future attacks by enabling the pirates to carry on their operations.
Paired with changes to the maritime insurance industry, improved corporate codes of
conduct, and the adoption of best practices for ship security, these steps could begin to
fill the gap between state security interests and private business interests that contributes
to the piracy cycle.

IV.

CONCLUSION: SAFE PASSAGE THROUGH TROUBLED WATERS
The international community finds itself at a crossroads. Exponential growth in

the costs of piracy threatens not only the maritime shipping industry but also state
security and consumers everywhere. Though corporations and insurers may be reticent to
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change the status quo, halting the flow of ransom payments is the only way to stop the
cycle. The global business community must to switch from a defensive posture to
preventative one by restructuring corporate incentives. This requires the application of a
universal, coherent scheme of liability for the multiple actors involved in the piracy
problem. It also requires the creation of harmonized, enforceable standards for the
maritime industry.
First, states should draw on the existing body of international law and use U.S.
material support statutes as a model to create anti-terrorism financing statutes that target
corporate ransom payments to pirates. This will remove the incentives for corporations
and their insurers to fuel the pirate explosion financially. Second, this legal approach
should be paired with improved corporate codes of conduct that are adapted to fill the
remaining gaps between international and domestic law, thereby increasing the efficacy
of this endeavor.
Finally, both of these strategies should occur within the context of improvements
to ship security through adoption of best practices advocated by the International
Maritime Organization or another body the international community deems most
effective. And as with any effort to combat turmoil coming from weakened states, the
overall approach should be undertaken in concert with development strategies designed
to build infrastructure in piracy hot zones. Taken together, these solutions provide the
tools to further coordinate an effective response to piracy at the international and
domestic levels.
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